

Are the objects of propositional
attitudes propositions in the
sense of propositional and
predicate logic?

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Notes for Taneli Huuskonen

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F(p) (Searle, Speech Acts, p. 31)

Kraft/Sinn (Frege)

Qualität/Materie (Husserl, LU)

Setzungscharakter
thetischer Charakter/Sinn(erleben)
(Husserl, Ideen I)

● modus/dictum (Bally)

propositional attitude / proposition (Russell)

neustic/phrastic (Hare)

● { functional component / sentence-
radical
mood / descriptive content
(Stenius)

illocutionary force / proposi-
tional content (Austin, Searle)

Cartesian cogito turned
linguistic

"... when I will, fear, affirm or deny, I indeed conceive something as the object of the action of my mind, but I also add something else by this action to the idea that I have of the object; and of this class of thoughts, some are called volitions or affections, and the others judgements." (Descartes, Third Meditation)

Brentano's classification of psychical phenomena into representations (Vorstellungen), judgements (Urteile) and emotional acts (Gemütsstätigkeiten), i.e. acts of love and hate

The object, or content, of a propositional attitude is that which is asserted, conjectured, wished etc. in an act of asserting, conjecturing, wishing etc.

assertion = judgement

Propositions in the sense of propositional and predicate logic are the things that the logical operations operate on.

\perp, T

$\sim A$

$A \supset B, A \& B, A \vee B$

$(\forall x \in D) A(x), (\exists x \in D) A(x)$

Are they the same as the objects, or contents, of propositional attitudes?

Early Frege (Begriffsschrift)

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} \vdash B \\ \vdash A \end{array}}{\vdash B} \quad \vdash A$$

Late Frege (Gedankengefüge)

(wenn A, so B) ist wahr

A ist wahr

B ist wahr

Modern notation

$$\frac{\vdash A \supset B \quad \vdash A}{\vdash B}$$

Frege, early and late, let the assertoric force \vdash operate on judgeable contents (Begriffsschrift) or thoughts. Also, it was these that were combined by means of the logical operations.

Frege of the middle period (1890's)

"Den Sinn des Namens eines Wahrheitswerthes nenne ich Gedanken."
(Grundgesetze, § 2)

"Jeder solche Name eines Wahrheitswerthes drückt einen Sinn, einen Gedanken aus. Durch unsere Festsetzungen, ist nämlich bestimmt, unter welchen Bedingungen er das Wahre bedente. Der Sinn dieses Namens, der Gedanke ist der,

dass diese Bedingungen erfüllt sind. ... Durch einen solchen Satz (sc. Begriffsschriftsatz) wird nun behauptet, dass dieser Name das Wahre bedente." (Ibid., § 32.)

thought in the sense of Grundgesetze

$\vdash (A \text{ true})$

judgeable content or thought in the sense of early resp. late Frege

Judgement

"Thus we have first a propositional concept, next its truth or falsity as the case may be, and finally the assertion of its truth or falsity." (Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, Appendix A, §477, p. 503)

propositional concept
↓ false
 $\vdash (A \text{ true})$
└── assumption
└── assertion

What is the type-theoretic analysis?

Constructively, a proposition in the sense of propositional and predicate logic is defined by its proof (rather than, truth) conditions, and the truth of a proposition is tantamount to the existence of a proof of it, which is to say that the rule


$a \text{ is a proof of } A$

$A \text{ is true}$

is meaning determining for the form of judgement

$A \text{ is true} = \vdash (A \text{ true})$

What entitles you to claim the truth of a proposition, is that you possess a proof of it. Except for these differences in the explanations of the notions of proposition, and truth, Frege's three component analysis of Goudgesette is vindicated.



Thus, also constructively, there is a difference between propositions in the sense of propositional and predicate logic and contents of assertions and other propositional attitudes. The truth operator, or truth particle, is needed to convert a proposition A into

the content

A true

which may be rendered

A to be true (acc. + inf.)

A's being true

the being true of A

A's truth

the truth of A

that A is true

in natural language.

proposition-radical-radical

↓
T(A true)

⏟

proposition₁-radical

⏟

complete proposition₁

Using the terminology introduced by Wittgenstein, (*Philosophische Untersuchungen*, §23, p. 11) and heavily exploited by

Stenius (Wittgenstein's Tractatus, chap. IX), the conclusion that I have reached may be expressed by saying that a proposition in the sense of propositional and predicate logic is not a proposition-radical (Satzradikal) to which it makes sense to apply the assertoric (or any other) force: it is merely a proposition-radical-radical. For it to become a proposition-radical, the truth operator must first be applied to it.

● assertoric content / ingredient sense

"... we must distinguish, ... between knowing the meaning of a statement in the sense of grasping the content of an assertion of it, and in the sense of knowing the contribution it makes to determining the

content of a complex statement
in which it is a constituent:
let us refer to the former as
simply knowing the content
of the statement, and to the
latter as knowing its ingre-
di-ent sense." (Dummett, Frege:
Philosophy of Language, pp. 446-7)

Dummett's terminology lends
itself perfectly to expressing
the result that we have reached.
Not only in nonintended inter-
pretations, involving many
truth-values or many possible
worlds, for example, is it
necessary to distinguish between
assertoric content and ingre-
di-ent sense: even in the
intended interpretation, there
is a difference between them.
To get to the assertoric con-
tent from the ingredient
sense, it is necessary first

to apply the truth operator to it.

ingredient sense
↓
 $\vdash (A \text{ true})$
└──────────┘
assertoric content

The answer to the question which was the title and starting point of my talk is clearly no.