Are the objects of propositional attitudes propositions in the sense of propositional and predicate logic?

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\( F(p) \) (Searle, *Speech Acts*, p. 31)

Kraft/Sinn (Frege)

Qualität/Materie (Husserl, *LU*)

Satzungscharakter

theotischer Charakter/Sinn(esleern)

(Husserl, *Ideen I*)

modus/dictum (Bally)

propositional attitude/proposition (Russell)

neustic/phrastic (Hare)

\{ functional component/sentence-radical

mood/descriptive content \}

(stenius)

illocutionary force/propositional content (Austin, Searle)

Cartesian cogito turned linguistic
... when I will, fear, affirm or deny, I indeed conceive something as the object of the action of my mind, but I also add something else by this action to the idea that I have of the object; and of this class of thoughts, some are called volitions or affections, and the others judgements." (Descartes, Third Meditation)

Brentano's classification of psychical phenomena into representations (Vorstellungen), judgements (Urteile) and emotional acts (Gemütstätigkeiten), i.e. acts of love and hate.

The object or content of a propositional attitude is that which is asserted, conjectured, wished etc. In an act of asserting, conjecturing, wishing etc.

assertion = judgement
Propositions in the sense of propositional and predicate logic are the things that the logical operations operate on.

\[ \bot, \top \]

\[ \neg A \]

\[ A \implies B, \quad A \land B, \quad A \lor B \]

\[ (\forall x \in \mathcal{D}) A(x), \quad (\exists x \in \mathcal{D}) A(x) \]

Are they the same as the objects of content of propositional attitudes?

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Early Frege (Begriffsschrift)

\[ \frac{B}{A} \quad \frac{A}{B} \]

Late Frege (Gedankenangefügte)

(wenn \( A \), so \( B \)) ist wahr

\[ A \text{ ist wahr} \]

\[ B \text{ ist wahr} \]
Modern notation

\[ \Gamma A = B \quad \Gamma A \]

\[ \Gamma B \]

Frege, early and late, let the assertoric force \( \Gamma \) operate on judgeable contents (Begriffsschrift) or thoughts. Also, it was these that were combined by means of the logical operations.

Frege of the middle period (1890's)

"Den Sinn des Namens eines Wahrheitwertes nenne ich Gedanken." (Grundgesetze, §2)

"Jeder solche Name eines Wahrheitwertes drückt einen Sinn, einen Gedanken aus. Durch unsere Festsetzungen ist nämlich bestimmt, unter welchen Bedingungen er das Wahrhebedeute. Der Sinn dieses Namens, der Gedanke ist der..."
That these conditions are fulfilled... Through a sentence (i.e., a concept-script-sentence) it is now declared that this name denotes the True.

(Numbers, § 32)

thought in the sense of Groundsätze

\[ T \] (A true)

judgeable content or thought in the sense of early resp. late Frege

judgement.

"Thus we have first a propositional concept, next its truth or falsity as the case may be, and finally the assertion of its truth or falsity." (Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, Appendix A, § 477, p. 503)
propositional concept

false

🔹 (A true)

assumption

assertion

What is the type-theoretic analysis?

Constructively, a proposition in the sense of propositional and predicate logic is defined by its proof (rather than truth) conditions, and the truth of a proposition is tantamount to the existence of a proof of it, which is to say that the rule

\[
\frac{a \text{ as a proof of } A}{A \text{ is true}}
\]

\[A \text{ is true} \]

is meaning determining for the form of judgment

\[A \text{ is true} = \vdash (A \text{ true})\]
What entitles you to claim the truth of a proposition, is that you possess a proof of it. Except for these differences in the explanations of the notions of proposition, and truth, Frege's three component analysis of Grundgesetze as vindicated

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prop

\vdash (A \text{ true})
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assertoric force

content

assertion or judgement

Thus, also constructively, there is a difference between propositions in the sense of propositional and predicate logic and contents of assertions and other propositional attitudes. The truth operator, or truth particle, is needed to convert a proposition \( A \) into
the content

A true
which may be rendered

A to be true (acc. + inf.)
A's being true
the being true of A
A's truth
the truth of A

that A is true

in natural language.

\[ \vdash (A \text{ true}) \]

Using the terminology introduced by Wittgenstein (Philosophische Untersuchungen, § 28, p. 11) and heavily exploited by
Stevins (Wittgenstein's Tractatus, chap. IX), the conclusion that I have reached may be expressed by saying that a proposition in the sense of propositional and predicate logic is not a proposition-radical (Satzradikal) to which it makes sense to apply the assertoric (or any other) force: it is merely a proposition-radical-radical. For it to become a proposition-radical, the truth operator must first be applied to it.

assertoric content/ingredient sense

...we must distinguish, ... between knowing the meaning of a statement in the sense of grasping the content of an assertion of it, and in the sense of knowing the contribution it makes to determining the
content of a complex statement in which it is a constituent: let us refer to the former as simply knowing the content of the statement, and to the latter as knowing its ingredient sense." (Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, pp. 446-7)

Dummett's terminology lends itself perfectly to expressing the result that we have reached. Not only in nonintended interpretations, involving many truth-values or many possible worlds, for example, is it necessary to distinguish between assertoric content and ingredient sense: even in the intended interpretation, there is a difference between them. To get to the assertoric content from the ingredient sense, it is necessary first
to apply the truth operator to it.

ingredient sense

\[ \neg (A \text{ true}) \]

assertoric content

The answer to the question, which was the title and starting point of my talk, is clearly no.